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Abstract: The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in 
the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper, drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist 
approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual 
epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s 
scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we 
should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. 
Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of 
an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic 
dimension to them that we should not ignore. 




The epistemology of disagreement literature centers around the epistemic 
significance of disagreement: when two people who are epistemic peers with each 
other disagree on an issue what are they required to do epistemically speaking? 
While some, known as steadfasters, claim that one can justifiably maintain one’s 
belief even in the face of such disagreement, others, known as conciliationists, argue 
that one should modify one’s opinion in light of that disagreement. In past work I 
demonstrate that these standard approaches are problematic approaches to political 
disagreements, as they make us vulnerable to cognitive biases (Carlson 2018). In 
this paper I will outline a more contextualist approach to political disagreement. 
Following within Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and casuistry paradigm 
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in medical ethics, I argue that paying attention to a given political disagreement’s 
scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether 
to respond to it at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy.
Why develop an epistemology of political disagreement? One reason to limit the 
scope is simply a matter of modesty. It is possible that this model will be useful for 
dealing with disagreements in other domains, but I do not wish to argue that this is a 
totalizing, one-size-fits-all approach to disagreements more generally. It is true that 
political disagreements have a lot in common with disputes in other domains, and 
it is possible that my discussion here will be useful elsewhere, but I do not want to 
argue for that broader claim here. 
One problem with this modesty of scope is that it may produce an ad hoc kind of 
epistemology. I am hesitant about claiming there is something uniquely distinctive 
property that all and only political disagreements have. That said, one distinctive 
property about many political disagreements is that the disputes are over what 
Gerald Gaus calls ‘social morality’ the rules that structure and govern our social 
interactions with each other (Gaus 2011: 2-3). Social morality is not as concerned 
about ethics in a very individualized sense – e.g. what makes for a good life, how a 
person might conduct themselves virtuously, etc. – but rather when we are permitted 
to place requirements on others to behave in certain ways, refrain from others, and 
so on. To illustrate the difference, if two people were having an ethical disagreement 
over, e.g. the permissibility of having an abortion, they can ‘agree to disagree’ and 
go their separate ways without requiring any resolution or consensus. But political 
disagreements are often not like that. At some point laws and policies on this issue 
have to be enacted (or not): abortion is either legally permitted or not, publicly funded 
or not, or some hybrid compromise position in between these options. Adopting any 
of these options necessarily involves coming to a decision, one that make demands 
on how people can behave, how they cannot, and so on. Determining the best 
response to a political disagreement, therefore, is not just a matter of looking for 
ordinary epistemic or moral justification. Instead one should look at which responses 
are politically justified, that is, which ones are acceptable to all involved citizens 
who disagree on a wide number of topics (Chambers 2010). 
1.1. Lackey and justificationism
For Lackey, what is peculiar in the epistemology of disagreement is that 
conciliationism seems to deliver the clearly right judgment about some cases, 
while steadfastness seems just as clearly to give the correct recommendation in 
others. In some disagreements the disputants are in an epistemically symmetrical 
relationship with each other, i.e. they are epistemic peers1 on some question p in the 
sense of being equally competent, intelligent, and fair-minded as the other about 
its domain, as well as being equally familiar with the evidence and argument that 
bears on it (Lackey 2010: 302). Where the justification seems to be more evenly 
balanced and neither side has the ‘epistemic upper hand’ on the other, Lackey thinks 
 
1 I discuss epistemic peerhood more thoroughly in the political context in §2.4.
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the conciliationist recommending modification of one’s doxastic states is likely the 
more correct strategy. By contrast, steadfast recommendations tend to be correct in 
situations where there is a ‘symmetry breaker’ between the two disputants, where 
one has a larger amount of expertise, knowledge, or information behind their position 
than their opponent has. No doxastic revision is required of one’s view when one 
disagrees with someone who is either less knowledgeable or well-informed about 
that situation (Lackey 2010: 318). Lackey takes these two points to mean that the 
epistemic significance of a disagreement depends on where the preponderance of the 
justification lies. When considering what to do in a given situation, the real question 
to ask is: where is the most justification?
Lackey takes this justificationist approach to mean that there is no simple, binary 
answer about what to do in a particular disagreement, whether to revise one’s belief 
or not (Lackey 2012: 106). Tim Kenyon also thinks the disagreement literature is 
misguided into thinking that there is a universally applicable answer or general 
formula to what we should do when we disagree. He aptly describes the issue of 
disagreement as akin to what to do when handed something: 
That there is no single privileged answer to the question, “What ought 
we to do, epistemically speaking, when faced with a disagreement?” is 
no more surprising, and certainly no bleaker, than the idea that there is no 
single privileged answer to the question, “What ought I to do, possession-
wise, when somebody hands me something?” It depends on whether I’m 
being handed a cake or a cobra ... (Kenyon 2019: 236-237). 
On Kenyon’s understanding of Lackey, we should be skeptical that there are 
very many broad general principles of how to respond to disagreements, and that 
is not necessarily a lamentable thing anyway. He suggests instead that we should 
adopt a more particularist, case-by-case approach to disagreement. But nevertheless, 
Kenyon takes this case-by-case approach to be a more adequate way of approaching 
disagreement overall.
2. Dimensions of political disagreements
But when asked “What should we do when we disagree?” an “It depends” answer 
is a pretty unsatisfying one. Depends on what? I want to take up this idea and develop 
it for political disagreements. I suggest that there are at least four dimensions that 
are relevant to what one should do (epistemically speaking) in a given political 
disagreement: domain, scope, genealogy, and urgency. While these dimensions are 
surely not the only ones worth thinking about, they provide some initially plausible 
considerations for thinking about how to respond to political disagreements.
For each dimension, I will also give a prima facie gloss of how differences along 
these dimensions might affect the epistemological evaluation of these respective 
types. To be clear, there are wide discussions raised in each of these dimensions, and 
my intention here is not to settle all, or even most, of these controversies. Rather, my 
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aim is to show why it is reasonable to think that different disagreement-types may 
warrant different epistemological evaluations and responses.
2.1. Domain
First, political disagreements differ in their domain: some disagreements are 
about facts about the empirical world, while others are about normative claims about 
what is valuable or how we ought to act. While treatments of political disagreements 
have usually centered on normative disputes – e.g. “What steps should we take to 
address climate change?” conflicts over factual matters – “Is anthropogenic climate 
change occurring?” – are also becoming increasingly salient in the current political 
atmosphere (Kappel 2017). Though there are good reasons to be skeptical of a firm 
distinction between these facts and values (Douglas 2014), for the moment we can 
treat these as conceptually distinct. 
Why think that this difference in domain is important for the epistemological 
questions surrounding political disagreements? Christopher Robert and Richard 
Zeckhauser (2011) point out that where a disagreement is over an empirical matter, 
one possible solution might be to continue the investigation, do some additional 
research, perhaps to put the two clashing views to an empirical test. Suppose that Ben 
and Rick are having a disagreement about whether increased government spending 
is a good policy response to a bad recession. We can determine the preponderance of 
evidence for this disagreement by examining how compelling each side’s normative 
arguments are. But suppose that their normative disagreement involves a further 
disagreement about whether increased deficit spending leads to substantially higher 
inflation. Determining where the preponderance of evidence lies for factual rather 
than normative disagreement involves not just weighing the arguments like in the 
normative case but considering whether the empirical data confirms or disconfirms 
either position. If it turns out that the relevant empirical data tends to confirm Ben’s 
claims about inflation and deficit spending, that seems to be one reason to think his 
view is epistemically preferable to Rick’s. If the empirical record was more mixed 
and muddled, that might be a reason to think that suspension of belief is perhaps 
more appropriate.
Insofar as this factual disagreement undergirds their original normative 
disagreement, the verdict reached on the factual matter can have some impact on how 
we evaluate the normative dispute as well. If Ben’s normative claims are supported 
by factual ones, but Rick’s claims are not, that provides at least some reason to think 
his normative claims might be preferable as well. Of course, disputes about policy-
relevant factual matters are not as neat and tidy as this picture suggests. The relevance 
of empirical testing should not lead us to be sanguine that political factual disputes 
are likely resolved by simply appeals to empirical tests – underdetermination and 
special-pleading are not unique to political disputes (Arabatzis 2008). But I think 
this example demonstrates that appeal to empirical testing is one way of responding 
to factual political disagreements that is not available to normative disputes.
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2.2. Scope
Second, political disagreements differ in their scope. Many disagreements are 
deep, in the sense that they are widespread about more than one issue. A staunch 
libertarian and a democratic socialist do not just disagree on government’s place in 
healthcare, but on a wide range of political issues as well. In the starkest examples, 
disagreements may go all the way down to differences in philosophical first 
principles. Robert Fogelin, took ‘deep disagreement’ to be conflict of fundamental 
epistemic principles (Fogelin 2005: 8). Other disagreements, though, are more 
localized in the sense that they take place against a background of general agreement 
on related issues. Following with the image of ‘deep disagreements’ we might call 
these localized disagreements ‘shallow’. People who generally agree that universal 
healthcare coverage is an important policy goal might still disagree about what kind 
of single payer or multi-payer system best implements that vision. 
The scope of disagreement plausibly affects how one should respond to it. 
Several epistemologists have argued that the conciliatory requirement diminishes as 
the scope of a disagreement widens. Martin Ebeling (2017) argues that disagreement 
with an epistemic peer on a political question obligates one to conciliate with 
them, but if one finds that the dispute is more widespread than originally thought, 
that diminishes the requirement to conciliate in that situation (Ebeling 2017, 82). 
Klemens Kappel (2018) has also argued that while disagreements might usually 
provide some undefeated higher-order evidence that one has made some error, 
that evidence is not as strong in situations of thoroughgoing, deep disagreement 
(cf. Pittard 2019) Though deep disagreements might cause some epistemic angst 
about whether one has made a fundamental mistake or relying on a non-truth-
conducive principle (Kappel 2018: 11), their presence alone does not undercut the 
judgment that the other person has made some serious and fundamental errors.
2.3. Genealogy
Third, it is plausible to think that political disagreements have different kinds of 
genealogical sources, particularly from both rational and irrational sources. Many 
political disagreements are caused by one or more irrational biases influencing at 
least one of the disputants. For instance, someone who disagrees with the factuality 
of the Sandy Hook shooting because they rely on a known to be unreliable source like 
Alex Jones as their primary source of information are likely disagreeing irrationally. 
Other instances of irrationality might be more subtly problematic, in that a person 
may hold irrational beliefs but nevertheless ostensibly satisfy epistemic criteria 
of rational belief. Endre Begby notes that when prejudicial beliefs are a part of a 
person’s background beliefs, it becomes epistemically rational for those beliefs to 
control, interpret, and evaluate new evidence and experiences (Begby 2013: 94). 
Motivated reasoning is another prominent cause of many political disagreements. 
Motivated reasoning describes a bias that skews one’s evaluation of the evidence in 
favor of the beliefs that one already holds (Lord et al. 1979). Antecedent political 
confidence also interferes with the ability to interpret statistical data correctly, even 
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among the most highly mathematically literate people (Kahan et al. 2017). While 
perhaps less egregiously irrational than the kinds of causes discussed, and others, 
it is plausible to think that motivated reasoning still produces irrational forms of 
disagreements (Ancell 2017). 
Despite the presence of all of these irrational forces on political disagreements, 
I think it would be too hasty to claim that all disagreements in this domain are 
irrational. There does seem to be some possibilities for reasonable political 
disagreements. One might think that disagreements can be the result of competent 
reasoning that has survived an extended period of good faith shared deliberation 
(McMahon 2009: 9). How is it possible that competent, good faith reasoning 
would nevertheless fail to produce a resolution? Walter Gallie argued that some 
interminable disputes in domains like politics are over what he terms “essentially 
contested concepts”: ideas whose application and validity are both not resolvable 
by rational argumentation, but “nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable 
arguments and evidence” (Gallie 1956: 169). Essentially contested concepts like 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, have complex components that are open for reasonable 
individuals to interpret and weigh them differently. When people weigh all of these 
complex issues independent of each other, they will invariably come to different 
positions. The essential contestability of political concepts often invites an anti-
realist or relativist understanding of the dispute about these topics: if there is no 
uniquely rational or superior way to understand these concepts, then perhaps there 
is simply no truth about the matter. Though he does not engage with the notion 
of ‘essentially contested’ concept, Alvin Goldman (2010) has presented a similar 
account of how reasonable disagreement can be possible. In a complex domain like 
politics, discovering one uniquely rational answer to many conflicting issues seems 
highly implausible. Goldman thinks that norms of inquiry in this difficult domain 
are likely to be permissive rather than prescriptive, indicating what range of ideas 
are rationally permissible to believe and enact rather than dictating some unique 
position. For instance, suppose a moderate libertarian Eric and a moderate liberal 
Jerry disagree about how to prioritize social well-being and personal autonomy. 
Even if we assume that there is a truth about how to balance these values, there 
might still be a range of reasonable or justifiable positions that cluster around the 
neighborhood of that ideal. 
John Rawls (2005) has similarly argued for the possibility of reasonable political 
disagreements based on the ‘burdens of judgment’. For most disagreements, the 
relevant evidence that bears on a dispute issue is often dispersed, indeterminate, not 
easily accessible, likely complex and open to more than one reasonable interpretation, 
and there can be different ways of balancing competing goals or values in light 
of it. If people are able to independently form their beliefs by using their rational 
faculties, Rawls thinks we should expect that they will come to different conclusions 
on the complex matters involving political issues (Rawls 2005: 56-7). To use the 
earlier example of well-being and autonomy, a moderate libertarian and a moderate 
liberal will likely disagree about how to prioritize one over the other, not necessarily 
because one them is being unreasonable or committing a gross error of irrationality, 
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but because each freely exercising their own rational capacities will not necessarily 
come to the same conclusions about how to weigh competing values.
While my intent of this paper is not to comprehensively discuss all aspects 
of reasonable disagreement, I think Christopher McMahon shows that even a 
seemingly moral conception of reasonableness has some epistemic components 
to it. Christopher McMahon helpfully distinguishes between reasonableness as 
competence and reasonableness as fairness. The former is the more epistemic 
notion, where one adequately uses one’s capacities of reasoning and judgment to 
develop a position that has prima facie plausibility in light of the available evidence 
(McMahon 2009: 18). Reasonableness in the second sense is the more moral sense 
where one makes and abides by fair terms of cooperation and is prepared to make 
appropriate concessions to others and their viewpoints in cooperative contexts 
(McMahon 2009: 19). We have reason to think a disagreement is reasonable when, 
despite extended good faith debate and deliberation, every position is reasonably 
rejected by at least one participant to the dispute (McMahon 2009: 26). When two 
people recognize that they are in a persistent and reasonable (in the competence 
sense) disagreement, if they are reasonable in the fairness sense they are willing 
to make some kinds of concession or accommodation with those other competent 
reasoners (McMahon 2009: 23). Political cooperation often requires certain kinds 
of concessions, but part of making concessions competently involves determining 
what values justify a particular concession, and how competing interests are brought 
into equilibrium. Whether a disagreement about justice or fairness is reasonable or 
not can involve explicating whether the respective sides could be the product of 
competent exercise of human reason and judgment (McMahon 2009: 25).2
Of course, while it might be uncontroversial to say that some political 
disagreements are reasonable while others are not, giving a clear and principled 
demarcation between the two will be hotly contested, especially in any particular 
case. One might think that the demarcation of reasonable and unreasonable is itself 
a relative idea. Infowars enthusiasts will likely claim that questions about the 9/11 
conspiracies or Barack Obama’s citizenship are at the very least matters of reasonable 
disagreement. Given certain background beliefs, these theories can certainly appear 
reasonable. Climate change skeptics will insist that their skepticism about attributing 
climate change to human activity is a matter of reasonable disagreement, despite 
the overwhelming consensus in the opposite direction. Under what conditions are 
disagreements reasonable? One might say, following Christopher McMahon, that 
disagreements are reasonable just in cases when all of the disputing parties are 
competent reasoners who give due consideration to all the relevant factors at play 
(McMahon 2009: 8-10). But dispute over what factors are relevant is often the very 
issue in many political disagreements. Though this is not an uncontroversial approach, 
I think one less problematic way we can understand ‘reasonable’ disagreement in 
this context is in a weak, minimalist sense that we have not been able to identify any 
obvious error in either party’s reasoning. This is not to say disagreements that are 
seen as reasonable actually meet some criteria of reasonableness from an objective, 
2 My thanks to a reviewer for drawing out this connection.
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God’s-eye-view perspective, but rather simply that we have not located the error in 
reasoning yet. Here I draw on an analogy of Robert Talisse’s weak epistemological 
pluralism that says there are value conflicts that do not seem amenable to any 
kind of rational resolution but not necessarily because of any culpable error on 
any disputant’s part: whether by failure of rationality, error in judgment, or lack 
of knowledge (Talisse 2012: 24-25). This gives attributions of reasonableness and 
unreasonableness a sense of provisionality, where disagreement that seemed to be 
reasonable at one time had a hidden flaw that was not fully appreciated at the time.
There may be other factors involved in how reasonable a disagreement is. 
For instance, it seems very plausible that social identities play a role here. Social 
identities place individuals and groups of people in certain social locations, 
meaning some will have a better understanding of social dynamics than others. 
More specifically, people in historically marginalized social locations may have an 
epistemic advantage in the sense of having a better awareness and understanding 
of systemic oppression (e.g. racism, sexism, etc.) they face than those in more 
privileged social locations (Wylie 2003). This social location thesis can become 
relevant when it comes to disagreements that happen between people in different 
social locations: if A and B disagree about whether a policy is sexist, it seems 
plausible that one of the participants being a man and the other being a woman could 
be relevant here. Of course disagreements that are the result of differential social 
positions might seem reasonable from one perspective – some evidence is available 
to those in one location but not another – in an important sense I think this would 
count as an unreasonable disagreement – the social location often being a result of 
social oppression, marginalization, and other forms of domination. Though I do not 
have the space to fully defend that claim here, I cannot dismiss a priori the relevance 
of social identities to political disagreements.
2.4. A brief note on epistemic peerhood
In epistemology of disagreement, distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable 
disagreements is usually taken to distinguish when one is permitted to dismiss a 
dispute without revising one’s beliefs. Not even the most extreme conciliationist 
thinks that changing one’s beliefs is the correct response to every disagreement, even 
if it is with a patently absurd and irrational conspiracy theorist.  Instead, they want to 
limit their conciliationist prescriptions almost exclusively to cases where epistemic 
peerhood obtains. In light of peerhood’s centrality to the disagreement literature, it 
is worth saying how this concept fits into this framework I have developed above. 
What epistemic peerhood amounts to is itself an open question: I mentioned 
earlier that according to Jennifer Lackey peerhood is when two individuals are equal 
in their abilities and expertise and share all the same evidence about the issue in 
question, but that is not the only view on offer. Others argue that it is when two 
people are equally reliable or just as likely to get the right answer as their counterpart 
(Elga 2007). In terms of the dimensions of political disagreements I have laid out 
above, epistemic peerhood seems to be most relevant to both the genealogy and 
scope. Considering whether someone is adequately informed on a dispute at issue is 
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important for determining how reasonable a disagreement is. Further investigation 
into another person’s reasons for their beliefs may reveal a much deeper disagreement 
than originally understood or more commonality between them. Discovering that a 
person gets a wide number of issues wrong (by our lights) or lacks some crucial 
knowledge might lead one to think that they are not a peer. 
Epistemic peerhood plays a significant theoretical role in determining what 
one should do in response to a political disagreement, as it can help distinguish 
disagreements that are worth taking seriously from those that obviously are not. But 
there are several problems with peerhood in the context of political disagreements. 
First, we often use partisan political affiliation as an indicator of what values a 
person holds and whether they tend to get important normative questions right or 
wrong. Suppose Jake, who is generally on the political left on most issues, discovers 
that Kelsey has affinities with the Republican party in the United States, Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany or a pro-Brexit party in the United Kingdom. 
Kelsey’s affinities with right-wing parties would signal that he tends to get many 
important political and moral questions wrong (in Jake’s view at least). This signal 
which would consequently motivate Jake to downgrade Kelsey as less than his 
epistemic peer (Elga 2007). Ebeling takes a similar position in his dynamic account 
of peerhood (Ebeling 2016: 151-156). While this kind of downgrading of peer status 
on the basis of things like party affiliation can be an epistemically acceptable, and 
even virtuous, response to disagreement, it can, among other things, also make us 
susceptible to credulous consumption of fake news (Rini 2017). 
But the most general problem with peerhood is that it is an idealized kind of 
epistemic relation that hardly ever occurs between two real-world individuals. It 
is next to impossible that two people have exactly the same levels of expertise, 
perfectly shared bodies of evidence, or are equally likely to be correct (King 
2012). It is even less likely that two people would recognize or acknowledge that 
this symmetry obtains between them. This poses a problem for the conciliationist 
because their prescriptions would only apply in situations that never actually obtain.3 
Idealizations are not inherently problematic, but the risk is that the conciliationist 
and the steadfast can simply say, “Well, since peerhood does not obtain in these 
scenarios, the prescriptions of my view simply do not apply.” I worry that we are 
expending significant energies on epistemologies that have little relevance on how 
we deal with real world disagreements, since their prescriptions are only relevant for 
an infinitesimally small slice of real world disagreements wherein peerhood obtains. 
I do not have the space here to develop a more suitable account of peerhood that 
can address these issues in the context of real-world political disagreements. For 
the moment, though, I think there are interesting epistemological questions about 
disagreements even when strict peerhood does not occur. Following a suggestion 
from Nathan King, we might consider a kind of higher-order uncertainty from 
disagreement generates a puzzle similar to recognized peer disagreement. Even 
3 This point may seem to give prima facie plausibility to the steadfast approach, but we should be 
hesitant to conclude that there is no epistemic significance from all non-peer political disagreements 
either. As discussed above, Nathan King describes how one can plausibly motivate an epistemic 
worry from disagreement without peer disagreement obtaining.
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though peerhood does not necessarily occur between the two disputants, it might still 
be unclear who is in a better epistemic position on that question (King 2012: 250). 
We might even consider a lower threshold of peerhood as potentially relevant for 
political disagreements. Andrew Rotondo calls a ‘deliberation peer’ someone whom 
one may think is wrong on a lot of important political issues, but nevertheless is 
someone “worthy of engagement and debate, from whom we can learn, who bring[s] 
significant arguments and evidence to the table, and whose opinions should not be 
curtly dismissed as inferior” (Rotondo 2015: 3). Disagreements with a deliberation 
peer may motivate one to give a position a hearing that may not otherwise be 
epistemically justified. While there is much more that needs to be said on this point, I 
think epistemologists of disagreement would be wise to consider how their idealized 
notion of peerhood cashes out in real-world cases, or begin to theorize about a 
broader range of cases beyond acknowledged peer disagreements.
2.5. Consequence
Finally, some political disagreements are consequential in ways that others are 
not. Some disagreements are inconsequential in that nothing hangs on their being 
resolved. Suppose Claire is having a disagreement with a more conservative family 
member over whether the individual mandate to have health insurance (required 
by the Affordable Care Act, a U.S. healthcare reform law) is an unconstitutional 
government overreach or a necessary aspect of a sustainable healthcare policy. In 
most discussions like this, neither person will provide enough reason to sway the 
other side; in which case, it seems like the only option is to come to no resolution. And 
this ‘agree to disagree’ outcome seems acceptable in part because there are likely no 
substantial consequences that result from that lack of resolution. Disagreements in 
informal settings seem to have this (relatively speaking) inconsequential character. 
But when Senators and Representatives deliberated over this very issue of the 
individual mandate in their legislative sessions, they likely went over much of the 
same evidence and arguments that Claire and her family member considered, and 
yet still had staunch disagreements over the issue. But what is different about the 
Congressional handling of this disagreement is that they cannot simply ‘agree to 
disagree’ in the way that Claire and her family did. And the reason why is simple: 
how they settled that question would have far wider consequences; their decision 
would have coercive authority on everyone subject to that law. Even if they failed 
to pass the bill, even that would have dramatic impacts on millions of people. It 
seems reasonable, then, to think that when coercive authority is at stake individuals 
should treat their disagreements differently than in situations where it is not. Andrea 
Sangiovanni has succinctly articulated the claim that many political disagreements 
are distinctive in that they make claim to the use of political authority:  political 
disagreements are “not merely about which party is epistemically justified…but 
which party is politically justified in laying claim to the armature of political authority 
… that shapes basic constraints and opportunities” (Sangiovanni 2008: 157). 
It seems reasonable then to think that in situations where coercive policy is being 
developed – as it is in formal legislation processes – more impartial justification is 
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required than in lower-stakes discussions of the same issue. The presence of coercive 
power in formal legislative and judicial contexts therefore plausibly encroaches 
on how one should respond to that disagreement in those high-stakes situations. 
The encroachment of coercion on certain political disagreements connects with 
a prominent theme in contemporary analytic epistemology known as pragmatic 
encroachment (Fantl and McGrath 2012). Christopher Hookway has articulated a 
similar notion of encroachment that explicitly draws out an epistemic relevance of 
practical concerns, namely in when we are justified in gathering more evidence and 
data or going forward with acting on the available evidence: “the greater the disaster 
if our actions fail to achieve their purpose, the more evidence we require before we 
regard the belief as properly justified; the greater the risks attaching to inaction, the 
readier we are to act on limited evidence” (Hookway 1990: 139). 
But even if practical considerations do encroach on our beliefs generally, why 
think that coercion should be one such practical consideration when it comes to 
certain political disagreements? Take the following example. Suppose that I have 
strong justification to believe it is ethically wrong to eat meat and therefore I should 
adopt a vegetarian diet and lifestyle. I might believe that if other competent moral 
reasoners considered the relevant factors about this issue, they would come to agree 
with me, and that the world would be better off if everyone converted to this way 
of life. But suppose we transposed these ethical beliefs about eating meat into the 
political domain, that I was a representative considering a law that would prevent 
people from consuming meat, or enact very stringent animal cruelty laws. Even if we 
granted the truth of this ethical belief, that would not on its own justify these political 
actions. Part of what distinguishes political beliefs from other evaluative claims like 
ethical ones is that the former are aimed at giving us normative instructions of how 
we ought to cooperate and interact with each other, in particular what should be 
prevented or allowed. Political morality thus inherently claims authority over others, 
how people are allowed or prohibited from interacting with each other, in a way that 
strictly speaking ethical concerns do not. When a disagreement gets transposed into 
a situation where coercive authority is at issue, it elevates the stakes of the situation. 
The people subject to the coercive policy would justifiably require a reason for that 
policy, one that they might not be warranted in asking for otherwise. An ethical 
belief does not necessarily commit one to the further political claim that the state is 
warranted in constraining people from acting differently. When political attitudes 
have this coercive element to them, it is reasonable to think that this elevates the 
stakes of what kind of justification is necessary for them to be acceptable. 
This request for a more impartial level of justification in the context of political 
morality is often cast as an issue of moral justification, but I think an epistemic 
aspect is operative as well. Thomas Nagel (1987) has argued for an epistemological 
division between the public and the private sphere, that we have to seek a more 
impartial justification for coercive political actions in the public sphere than we 
do for ordinary moral beliefs in the private space: “…in certain contexts I am 
constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather than as truths, however 
convinced I may be that they are true, and that I know it” (Nagel 1987: 230).4 On 
4 Thanks to a reviewer for making this point.
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his account, we do not have to stop thinking that our beliefs are true or justified 
according to our own comprehensive epistemological perspective, only that from 
the political perspective they are required to meet some more impartial justification. 
Importantly, this impartial justification is not necessarily a ‘higher’ justification. 
An impartial justification that meets Nagel’s standard for the public sphere may 
still fail to meet a person’s more demanding comprehensive epistemological 
criteria (cf. Bardon 2018). A related epistemic consideration is that the justifications 
provided have to be acceptable to those who ask for it. As Fabienne Peter puts it, 
if a policy is to be politically justified it must be justified to the citizens who are 
subject to it (Peter 2019). If there is no accessible reason available to them to accept 
some political decision, then we have some good reason to think that decision is not 
politically justified. It is highly unlikely that everyone would buy into those reasons 
that I find acceptable, chiefly because reasonable disagreement likely obtains in 
even the most idealized scenario. In the example of outlawing meat-eating given 
above, it is more plausible that many reasonable people would not come to the same 
conclusion as I do about prohibitions on the production and consumption of meat. 
As a result, one should seek for the more impartial justification that other reasonable 
people could theoretically accept. Of course, while actual individuals may not find it 
acceptable some idealized rational individuals would find. (See Vallier 2014, ch. 5).
In surveying these four dimensions, a given disagreement will fall somewhere 
along each of these dimensions. Thus, there will be deep, irrational, consequential 
factual disagreements, as well as narrow, reasonable, non-consequential normative 
disagreements, and all the combinations in between.
3. Responding to disagreements
3.1. Levels
Responding to a given political disagreement can take place at three distinct 
levels: confidence, beliefs, and policy. They could take place at the level of 
confidence. Suppose two women, Briana and Maria, disagree on the justice of 
legally permitting abortions. Each have divergent credences on the question of the 
justice of abortion of .2 and .8, respectively. After discussion with each other, though 
neither side was defeated by their interlocutor, they were also not able to successfully 
rebut their arguments either. This disagreement seems to involve what Gerry Gaus 
calls ‘undefeated but unvictorious’ proposals, where it is possible for someone to 
reasonably endorse a position, but also possible for others to reasonably reject it 
(Gaus 1996: 151-152). As a result, they become less confident in their original 
position, and therefore revised their respective credences to .3 and .7. We can also 
talk about the confidence level in less formal terms of going from more to less 
confident in one’s position in light of a disagreement. There is no presumption that 
credence-conciliation would require any significant alteration to either one’s beliefs 
or their justifications for them. Ballantyne (2013) gives an example of confidence-
adjustment without content-adjustment. The empirical research on how much people 
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overestimate their own skills and competency may even support the more radical 
claim that disagreement (at least with one’s epistemic equals) should make a person 
weakly confident that they themselves are wrong (Wiland 2016).
We could also respond at the level of the content of our beliefs. Martin Ebeling 
exemplifies this level in his case of three legislators (A, B, C) who are deliberating 
on what the top tax rate should be: A says 40%, B 50%, C 60%. If A, B, C are peers 
with each other (i.e. agree on all the factual and normative issues related to this 
question), then Ebeling thinks the uniquely rational thing for them to do is “achieve 
full epistemic conciliation” with each other, in this case at 50% (Ebeling 2017: 173). 
Though adjusting one’s confidence does not necessarily require any alterations of 
one’s beliefs, often they are related: it is difficult to imagine a substantial shift in 
one’s confidence without some attendant alteration in one’s beliefs. If someone 
provides you with a previously unconsidered argument or reason to think one’s 
beliefs are false, that will often result in one becoming less confident in those beliefs. 
One could also include in this level of conciliation the modification of reasons and 
justification as part of the content of the belief, where one is incorporating those new 
justifications into one’s belief structure. 
Finally, we can respond at the level of a plan or policy. On this level, we are 
not adjusting our beliefs or confidence in them; instead, we are agreeing on a plan 
or policy that in some way accommodates some of the representative viewpoints. 
Policy-level resolutions often take the form of a compromise, where disagreeing 
parties see the ultimate resolution as a second-best option that is inferior to what 
their ideal solution would be (Wendt 2016: 14).
What is the relationship between these three levels? These levels of responses 
are conceptually independent of each other: while becoming less confident in one’s 
beliefs might at some point motivate making some significant modifications of one’s 
first order beliefs, that connection is not necessary. Similarly, modifying at the policy 
level does not necessarily require substantial revision at the level of one’s beliefs or 
confidence.
3.2. Epistemic legitimacy of compromises
Incorporating compromises into an epistemological account raises several 
questions about the epistemology of political compromises. First, how does a 
compromise on policy differ from mere bargaining that is part and parcel of the 
normal operations of politics? The concern about mere compromise is that this 
creates a kind of modus vivendi agreement. Rawls (2005) speaks of a modus vivendi 
as an agreement wherein two parties resolve a conflict only out of pursuit of their 
own interests. They do not come to terms because they have converged on some 
justification that all parties find acceptable but because they are not able to pursue 
their own interests or achieve their own ideological goals in any other way. I suggest 
that compromises can be an epistemic kind of modus vivendi, where there are no 
epistemic reasons to justify it, but only practical ones. Second, compromises are 
epistemically peculiar because they are by their very nature viewed as the second-
best option. While there might be practical justification for adopting a compromise 
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(May 2005) is there any distinctively epistemic justification these second-best 
compromises might have? 
There are several ways to develop what epistemic justification for compromises 
might look like. Federico Zuolo and Giula Bistagnino (2018) argue that a compromise 
can be epistemically motivated by recognizing the other party as an epistemic peer, 
or an epistemic equal. While this is a helpful response, I think there is more we can 
say about the epistemic justification of compromises. 
The alternative to an epistemic modus vivendi I have in mind here is that the 
agreement they eventually come to should meet some kind of epistemic legitimacy 
criterion. What might epistemic legitimacy look like? Epistemic legitimacy can be 
located in two different sources: in the final outcomes or decisions that a political 
body generates or in the procedures by which the body comes to its decisions. This 
first source would be a kind of substantial legitimacy: an agreement A is epistemically 
legitimate only if all parties to it can locate a reason in their set of beliefs that would 
make A acceptable to them. The second source is a procedural kind of legitimacy, 
where the source is legitimate because it was produced by an epistemically fair 
procedure. Fabienne Peter points out that these sources of legitimacy are not 
mutually exclusive, as one can have a substantive (or ‘rational’) proceduralism that 
combines both sources as conditions of epistemic legitimacy: a compromise must be 
rationally justified as well as decided by an epistemically fair procedure (Peter 2007: 
338-339). David Estlund (2009) has defended this kind of hybrid position he calls 
epistemic proceduralism on the grounds that, if his account is correct, it shows that 
democratically fair procedures are not just good in themselves but also serve one of 
the central epistemic goals of achieving true beliefs. One might worry, though, that 
looking for compromises that are epistemically legitimate in Estlund’s substantial 
sense is unrealistic, as it would require more agreement than we could expect to 
get in a situation where resorts to a compromise decision. In fact, since participants 
will likely view their original pre-compromise position as more fully true than the 
compromise itself, requiring agreement that the end decision is the truest option 
seems implausible.  
I think the more purely proceduralist account developed by Peter would be 
more realistic account of legitimacy in situations where epistemic compromises are 
usually called for. One can find a policy outcome unacceptable in its content, while 
still thinking that it is acceptable because the procedure by which it was decided 
is acceptable. Following her account of pure epistemic proceduralism, what is 
required for compromises to be legitimate is not only that all parties to the dispute 
can participate in the deliberation and decision-making process under conditions 
of political and epistemic fairness, that but also that all are able to “regulate 
public deliberation at the fact-gathering and analysis stages” (Peter 2007: 343-4). 
Furthermore, one can see these kinds of democratic procedure as themselves 
compromises: Aurelia Bardon (2018) has argued that democratic procedures are 
themselves best viewed as epistemic compromises that do not have to be acceptable 
as a more comprehensive epistemology. For instance, suppose one is a religious 
person who believes that revelation is a vitally important epistemic source for one’s 
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beliefs about God and the world, but one is considering a set of rules and procedures 
that do not permit revelation as a valid source of evidence in its proceedings. On 
Bardon’s view, it is not inconsistent for this religious person to affirm this public 
epistemology as acceptable in the public sphere while rejecting it as a satisfactory 
epistemology outside of that limited scope. As long as everyone agrees that these 
kinds of procedures are acceptable for use in deciding public or political questions, 
they can reject these procedures in favor of a more expansive epistemology to answer 
comprehensive questions that fall outside of the public sphere.
4. Justificationism revisited
4.1. Beyond Lackey
To connect this discussion of political disagreements to Lackey’s justificationism, 
to address the different kinds of political disagreement outlined above, we have to 
look beyond Lackey’s account. First, answering Lackey’s specific question about 
where the balance of epistemic justification lies would likely rely on asking at least 
some of these questions like “How much justification do we need? Is it a factual 
disagreement or normative one? Narrow or wide?” Why might these considerations 
be relevant to determining where the preponderance of the evidence lies and 
how we should respond to a given disagreement? It is true that a disagreement’s 
domain, scope, or stakes do not tell us anything directly about where the balance 
of justification lies in a given case or what we should do in light of that. But I want 
to suggest that these elements of a disagreement can indicate what information is 
relevant as evidence. The inflation case discussed in §2.1 already demonstrates how 
determining the domain of a disagreement is helpful in adjudicating it.
Scope can be similarly helpful in determining how to respond to a disagreement. 
Suppose that Laura and Siray are having a disagreement about whether a given 
shutdown order is an advisable policy in response to a coronavirus outbreak. Suppose 
that while Laura’s support for the shutdown is based on mainstream epidemiologists’ 
recommendations, but Siray opposes it because he gets his news about COVID-19 
exclusively from watching conspiracy theorists like Alex Jones and Youtube videos 
like “Plandemic”. His use of unreliable sources seems like a good reason to think their 
disagreement is fairly deep but also unreasonable, and that Laura’s is epistemically 
preferable. Conversely, suppose Siray is a reasonably well-informed and competent 
philosopher of science and has come to the judgment that epidemiologists’ data are 
insufficient to support a stringent shutdown. He and Laura might still have a fairly 
deep disagreement, but if he can provide some reasonable defeaters that undermine 
her position, then it might be reasonable to think that Laura should move closer to 
his view, or perhaps become less confident in her original position. 
I think we can improve upon Lackey’s justificationism. I will call this 
development ‘political justificationism’. This view has two parts: one can respond 
to political disagreements at three different levels: confidence, content, and policy. 
Determining at what level to respond will likely depend on the specific features of 
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the disagreement is: what it’s about, how widespread it is, its genealogical sources, 
and its consequence.
4.2. Problems for political justificationism
A natural question that arises for this position is how these two pieces interact. 
How do the features of a disagreement determine what level of response it should 
receive? One might hope that one could give a general account of political 
disagreement. “Having an unreasonable value disagreement? Stick to your guns at 
all levels!” “Having a reasonable factual disagreement? Adopt a compromise on 
a policy that’s acceptable to all parties involved.” I want to lay out two reasons 
to be skeptical that construing political justificationism as this kind of generalist 
epistemology is plausible. This pessimistic attitude is motivated, first, by how many 
different kinds of disagreement there are. While I think the diversity detailed in §2 
is a virtue for political justificationism, it is not a comprehensive account. Political 
justificationism presents a complex menagerie of disagreements, but it must be noted 
that these dimensions still elide numerous further complications and nuances that we 
find when we examine individual cases. The nuances of these specific disagreements 
could plausibly affect how we should respond to them.
 Take the domain dimension distinguishing disagreements over facts and norms. 
Not all policy-relevant facts are the same. While well-informed expert opinion tends 
to coalesce in some static domains, it tends to diverge wildly in others (Shanteau 
2015). Politically relevant facts are thus likely just as variable in this same respect. 
But what would follow epistemically from the claim that fewer disagreements arise 
in the former domains than in the latter ones? Should we characterize disagreements 
in discordant domains as more reasonable than those where convergence more 
regularly happens? Such a sweeping claim seems presumptuous to make from the 
philosophical armchair. 
Furthermore, factual and value disagreements are themselves often so closely 
intertwined it is often difficult to pinpoint where to locate a particular disagreement 
on the domain spectrum. Disagreement about whether life begins at conception might 
appear to be factual dispute related to abortion, but, even if it is a factual question, it 
often spills over into more normative claims about whether to prioritize the value of 
a woman’s autonomy or the life of a fetus, the interpretation and relevance of sacred 
scriptures, and so on. Adjudicating the reasonableness of abortion disagreement may 
require determining the reasonableness of those more specific disputes. 
Further nuances arise when we consider the scope dimension more closely. All 
deep disagreements are also not all deserving of the same kind of response. Some 
deep disagreements are the result of belief polarization, where individuals become 
more extreme in their attitudes. It is a common assumption that belief polarization is 
generally epistemically undesirable, perhaps even irrational. For instance, Thomas 
Kelly (2008) has argued that the presence of belief polarization in our beliefs 
should give us pause about how confident we are in them. But we should be wary 
of taking the epistemic undesirability of these kinds of deepening disagreement 
as a general principle. There are some empirical instances (Lindell et al 2017) of 
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deepening disagreement in deliberative forums that do not seem to have many of the 
epistemic defects that are normally ascribed to polarizing beliefs. There are also lots 
of complexities along the urgency dimension as well. While disagreements over an 
annual budget might be urgent in some important sense, they are likely not as exigent 
as disagreements over a human right legislation. The differences even within tokens 
of the same type of disagreement make me skeptical that they warrant the same kind 
of response.
I think what follows from this diversity of political disagreements makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, to expect a general epistemology of political 
disagreements from the philosophical armchair. In one sense it is uncontroversial 
to say that there is not a general response to disagreements. Not even the most 
extreme conciliationist or steadfaster suggests that their prescriptions apply to all 
disagreements. But the more specific claim I am defending is that we should be 
skeptical of very broad generalities about how we should respond even to different 
types of political disagreement. If there is an account that can do justice to the 
diversity of these disagreements – both between the different types and also tokens 
of the same type – it may depend on the particular features of the context in which 
the disagreement takes place. Luckily, we have a model for this kind of reasoning 
from the casuistry tradition in bioethics that is skeptical of starting with abstract 
general moral principles to decide what to do in medical decisions (Jonsen and 
Toulmin 1988, Jonsen 1995, Arras 1991). On the generalist view they oppose, 
making ethical decisions involves starting from universally applicable moral 
principles, and then applying them in particular circumstances. Practitioners of 
casuistry, or casuists, argue that this generalist top-down methodology is too 
insensitive to the particular nuances of cases. They instead favor evaluating situations 
on a more case-by-case basis. When evaluating what to do in a given situation, they 
begin with a thorough description of the features of a case. Albert Jonsen, Mark 
Siegler, and William Winslade have developed a four-box analysis method that 
conceptualizes the relevant aspects of a medical case: a patient’s clinical indications 
(Given her condition, how can she be benefited or not harmed?), her quality of 
life (What are the prospects for her having a decent quality of life?), the patient’s 
preferences (Is the patient’s right to make an informed choice being respected?), 
and other contextual features (What procedure and outcome is fair and just to all 
parties involved?) (Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade 2006: 7). While general moral 
principles like autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice can certainly 
play a role in these kinds of deliberations (see Jonsen 1995), casuistry relies more 
heavily on reasoning by analogy to decide what should be done.
4.3. Political justificationism:  
a casuistic epistemology of political disagreement
Following the four-box method from casuistic medical ethics, I propose a similar 
four-box method (displayed in Figure 1) for analyzing political disagreements. 
While it might be difficult to provide many broad principles how to deal with the 
complex types of disagreement, I will sketch out how political justificationism’s 
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analysis might be helpful. Let us examine a case of disagreements that are deep and 
reasonable. Suppose we return to the case mentioned in §3.1 of Briana and Maria 
deliberating over whether abortion should be legally permissible. After they discuss 
the reasoning behind their positions, neither is able to provide a decisive defeater for 
the other person’s position. However, each of them seems to be peers, in at least a 
minimal sense that they have both demonstrated themselves to be competent, well-
informed, reflective, and good-faith reasoners about this issue. Since they seem to 
be on an epistemic par with each other, that gives them some reason to think that 
their respective positions might not be the only reasonable ones or that they may 
have made some kind of error. And nothing hinges on their failure to agree; they 
are not deciding policy or ruling on current legal case. In light of all these features 
a moderate epistemic revision seems like a permissible response. They might 
moderately reconsider how confident they are about their respective positions. Of 
course, such judgments of reasonableness and moderation are defeasible, as this case 
is abstractly and idealistically sketched. It is possible that Brian or Maria provided a 
defeater that the other person should have recognized but failed to. If their discussion 
revealed that either Briana and Maria’s views were founded on accurate or misleading 
information or that one (or both) of their attitudes were being influenced by some 
cognitive biases that would provide some reason for a different judgment.
But not all putatively reasonable disagreements will necessarily get the same 
treatment. Suppose city council members, represented by Lori and Toni, are 
considering implementing a shutdown order to deal with a pandemic. Suppose 
Lori represents those council members who think the shutdown recommended by 
a majority of epidemiologists is the best. Toni, on the other hand, represents those 
who think that a shutdown is not the way to go, and their conclusion is not based 
on listening to unqualified cranks or conspiracy theorists, but on well-informed, 
competent epidemiologists who happen to dissent from that majority opinion. As far 
as each side can tell, the other side is not substantially more or less competent and 
well-informed than they are. But even though Toni and Lori represent what seems to 
be a reasonable disagreement, their dispute is more consequential than Briana and 
Maria’s, as the council members will have to make an ultimate decision one way or 
the other, one that will have dramatic effects on others. In a less dire situation, it might 
be reasonable to put off making that choice while they can gather more information 
that might help resolve their dispute. But in a crisis situation like a pandemic, one 
often does not have the luxury of researching policy proposals indefinitely. They 
have to make the choice given the information available to them. 
What should we make of political disagreements that seem more un reasonable? 
One example to consider is the Finnish deliberative poll discussed by Marina Lindell 
et al (2017). The researchers wanted to compare the differences between those who 
deliberate in like-minded groups and those who are in more heterogeneous groups. 
Prior research suggested that the participants in like-minded groups would engage in 
more polarization than the heterogeneous group.  Based on a survey of their initial 
attitudes on immigration coming into the deliberation, they were then randomly 
allocated to like-minded groups, heterogenous groups, or a control group. In this 
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study, participants who polarized their opinions did not display many of the features 
that ordinarily make polarization problematic from a normative standpoint: they 
formed their beliefs in heterogenous groups – so there was very little possibility 
for a groupthink dynamic – and showed normal levels of information absorption 
and learning (Lindell et al. 2017: 39). One might expect those who moderated their 
position post-deliberation would be the ones who learn more, display more empathy, 
and become more open-minded. But in this case, the polarizers displayed many of 
the same behaviors and dispositions as those who moderated their opinion (Lindell 
et al. 2017: 40). 
How would the four-box method approach this case? Is that polarized attitude shift 
epistemically justified? The first thing that stands out here is the apparent absence of 
epistemically undesirable biases or forces: there were  not any obvious group effects 
or individual biases that were influencing people in epistemically problematic ways. 
Regarding urgency, they are not policy-makers crafting immigration policy so there 
are no implications from them failing to agree, nor are they coming together to make a 
collective conclusion or decision either. Since many of the epistemically problematic 
features of polarization did not show up in this case, that provides some reason to 
think this polarizing behavior was more reasonable than it originally seemed. One 
suggestion is that the participants were exhibiting preference clarification where, 
as a result of deliberation and discussion, individuals come to have a clearer, more 
reflective understanding of what their actual commitments and preferences are 
Domain
• What is the disagreement about?
• How persistent is disagreement in this 
domain?
• Does this disagreement involve any 
observational predictions?
• What kind of evidence bears on this 
disagreement?
Scope
• How widespread is the disagreement? 
• What are the places where evidence is  
not shared?
• In what sense are the disputants epistemic 
peers, if at all?
Genealogy
• What is the source of the disagreement?
• Under what circumstances did this 
disagreement arise?
• What biases are being manifested by 
participants in this disagreement?
• Are there any identifiable cognitive biases 
that are influencing either party to the 
dispute?
• How might social identities contribute  
to this disagreement?
Urgency
• Does this disagreement need to be  
resolved?
• Are there any likely consequences to  
a failure to agree? 
• Are there any likely consequences  
by coming to an agreement too quickly?
• If a disagreement is urgent, what sort of 
features does it need to have?
Figure 1. A 4-box approach to political disagreement.
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(Lindell et al 2017: 23). Preference clarification may sometimes result in convergence 
and moderation of opinions, but it may also result in polarization. 
The authors conclude, rightly in my estimation, that we should not assume that 
polarization as a result of preference clarification is necessarily bad, epistemically 
speaking. One might wonder, though, about the long-term epistemic effects of 
such further polarization; while the clarification of their preferences might be 
worthwhile and desirable epistemic achievement in isolation, one concern is how 
that development might affect subsequent interactions. Will this polarization incline 
them to further retreat into ideological informational silos that entrench their views 
and make them less open to hearing the other side, or less likely to see those they 
disagree with as reasonable?
5. Conclusion
I began this paper with the aim of developing a more adequate epistemology 
of political disagreement, specifically through Lackey’s justificationist approach. 
I have argued that what follows from her approach is that there is neither one 
kind of political disagreement, nor even one level at we can respond to them. 
While these points might seem rather banal, I think the importance of noticing the 
diversities at play illustrates the difficulty in developing a generalist approach to 
political disagreement that seems to be the default assumption in much discussion 
of epistemology of disagreement. The alternative I have sketched out here suggests 
that figuring out how to properly respond to political disagreement is likely going to 
require paying attention to the fine-grained details of its type and its circumstances 
and then a good deal of deliberation (internally but interpersonally) about which 
level of response – confidence, content, or policy – is warranted.
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